

# The Tiananmen Papers, Real or Fake? A Summing Up on the 35<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Tiananmen Events (August 2024)

by Alfred L. Chan

Just before the thirtieth-fifth anniversary of China's Tiananmen events and crackdown of 1989, *Foreign Affairs* again published online lengthy excerpts from the *Tiananmen Papers: The Chinese Leadership's Decision to Use Force Against Their Own People -In Their Own Words* compiled by Zhang Liang and edited by Professors Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link, with an afterward by Orville Schell (Public Affairs Press, 2001) (hereafter TP) with a new introduction. This book is purported a translation of Zhang Liang's *June Fourth: The True Story*, 2 volumes (Mirror Books, 2001) (hereafter TS), based on the top-secret Chinese documents he claims that he spirited out of China. The publication of TS/TP twenty-three years ago was a media event covered by an episode of CBS's *60 Minutes* and TP has since been translated into many foreign languages. On many occasions since then, Professor Nathan has strongly vouched for the authenticity of TS/TP, and even claimed that their publication might have influenced Chinese politics at the top.

Authentic and unaltered historical documents are primary sources and time capsules which are invaluable to historians, researchers, and the society at large, and they are fundamental to our understanding of events in the past. However, it should be perfectly clear by now that TS/TP are not the authentic top-secret documents as they have been cracked up to be. The 35<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Tiananmen events and the republication of the TAMP in June 2024 are an appropriate time to revisit and take stock of the issues. With all due respect for the editors' reputation and expertise, I will repeat my point that the authenticity of TS/TP cannot be established. This article is not a mere opinion piece – all the information I supply can all be empirically verified by the readers. TS is written in traditional Chinese (complicated characters) and is therefore more difficult to read, even by mainland Chinese who are brought up with simplified Chinese characters. I will also provide information on some academic conventions for the general readers to explain why the editors' claim to authenticity amounts to nothing.

Readers who read both English and traditional Chinese can do fact checks themselves. However, Readers of English will also find more than sufficient information to reject the editors' claim of authenticity. I have provided hyperlinks to most of the sources used in this article, although copyrighted materials may be protected by a paywall. Some older internet sources are no longer available but many can be retrieved through other means with a little digging. This author would be happy to respond to requests for sources. Overall, despite all the hype and mystery created by the editors, it is really not that difficult to overthrow the claims of authenticity once and for all.

According to Professor Nathan, highly classified documents were spirited out of China by a person known only by the pseudonym Zhang Liang who sought him out to publish these into Chinese and English. The materials claim to consist of "minutes of the leaders' formal and informal meetings and accounts of their private conversations" and were "distributed only to the top forty or so leaders, and many were limited even more sharply to the five-man Politburo Standing Committee plus the eight elders" (TP, p. xvii). TS/TP were subsequently published using this source, and the secrets they revealed, according to the editors, are so sensitive that they were "likely to damage the careers of the two most powerful leaders in China, Jiang Zemin and Li Peng, and to boost the authority of several of their high-ranking rivals." Li Peng would be "seriously damaged," and so would other Politburo members Li Tieying, Luo Gang, and Jiang Chunyun. Eight other Politburo members would likely benefit from the revelations made in TP. (pp. xxii – xxv).

Many China watchers have accepted TS/TP as the real McCoy, mostly out of respect for the editors, but the questioning of the authenticity of TS/TP has never ceased. It turned out TS/TP had no impact on Chinese politics whatsoever, and the Chinese went about their own business as usual. Critics have charged that TS is essentially a cut-and-paste job plagiarized from lesser open sources. As early as 2004, [this author and Professor Nathan had debated the authenticity in the March issue of \*China Quarterly\*](#), a leading journal on China studies. I followed this debate with another "re-rejoinder" entitled "[Fabricated Secrets and Phantom Documents: the "Tiananmen Papers" and "China's Leadership Files," A Re-Rejoinder \(June 19, 2005\) published on my university's website.](#)" Overall, I argued that a careful scrutiny shows that TS is part fiction and part documentary history based on open and semi-open sources and document collections. The

alleged minutes of top-level meetings are basically stitched together ex post facto and then presented as secret documents. Furthermore, TP is a heavily retouched version of the Chinese with differences in claims of authenticity, translation, citation and style. No evidence exists that any real secret documents on top-level decision-making are in the hands of Zhang Liang. Professor Nathan's rejoinder avoided my key arguments or simply said that the anomalies I pointed out were editorial decisions. Readers who are interested in detailed textual analysis may refer to these publications.

More recent developments and information have given further support to my original appraisals. Just this June, [BBC Chinese](#) published an article entitled "The 35th anniversary of June 4: Why did the Tiananmen Documents, which reveal the CCP's inner workings, spark a debate over authenticity?" Bao Pu, an experienced China watcher and reliable publisher of Zhao Ziyang's memoirs, also raised the issue of authenticity.

In Western academic circles, Julian Gewirtz's book *Never Turn Back: China and the Forbidden History of the 1980s* (Harvard University Press, 2022), citing concerns about TP's authenticity, used it "sparingly." Jeremy Brown's *June Fourth: The Tiananmen Protests and Beijing Massacre of 1989* (Cambridge University Press, 2021) refused to use it altogether. Further back, in his book reviews of TP in 2001, Professor Timothy Brook suspected that ["the documents from June 3-4 were fabricated"](#) and Professor Lowell Dittmer said that ["nearly everything about the documents is still controversial."](#)

It is important to stress that among the 798 documents contained in TS/TP (Professor Nathan's estimate), I do not question the authenticity of sources which exist in the public domain and are either available openly or are contained in various document collections. This includes items such as *People's Daily* editorials, *Xinhua News Agency* dispatches, handbills, proclamations made by students, workers, and intellectuals, and State Educational Commission directives, etc. Instead, I have demonstrated that most sensational and critical items, the so-called "never-before-published" materials, the minutes or transcripts of Politburo meetings and conversations among China's top leaders, were stitched together by using lesser sources. I've made this clear in my critique, but Professor Nathan has lumped the two types of material together to assert authenticity. He also simply asserted that the minutes of Politburo meetings and private conversations are authentic. Many of these materials are selected in the compilation in

*Foreign Affairs* (June, 2022 and 2024), making it even more convenient for the readers to do some fact checking by using the information I supply in this article. Professor Nathan has once again identified some of the documents here as “transcripts” even though at many instances the editors have disavowed having any such thing. More than ever, we need to get to the bottom of the matter. My view is that it is not difficult to overturn the editors’ claim of authenticity. The evidence provided by them is actually more than sufficient to disprove their claims of authenticity. I will consider this evidence. Then I will discuss other additional contextual and circumstantial factors by drawing on academic standards and convention.

## **The Editors’ Open Discussions and Revelations**

### **Professor Nathan’s Admissions and Revelations**

Professor Nathan has often asserted the authenticity of TS/TP but when under intense criticism, he has conceded otherwise. On the other hand, Professors Nathan and Schell’s views are not always consistent with one another, with the latter taking a more cautious line. Overall, their discussions of their encounter with Zhang Liang and the authentication process actually provide the most devastating evidence to disprove any claims of authenticity. Professor Nathan’s conflicting claims and odd definition of authenticity are open for all to see.

According to the [International Standard of Organization, an authentic record](#) is one that can be proven (a) to be what it purports to be, (b) to have been created or sent by the person purported to have created or sent it, and (c) to have been created or sent at the time purported. In the context of Chinese history in 1989, there are also three conditions. First, the documents would be genuinely classified materials intended for the eyes of only a small group Chinese leaders or transcripts of high-level internal exchanges. Secondly, they would not have been tampered with or altered. Thirdly, they would be original documents submitted to Party Central by subordinate agencies and not reconstructed by research from open or semi-open sources. An analogous example of authentic documents might be the transcripts of original White House recordings made during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War and the Watergate Affair, Pentagon Papers. One cannot regard as authentic the spate of fictions, dramas, film scripts and

popular histories that utilize or incorporate these documents, no matter how accurately they represent the events.

*The Phantom Documents*. First, a fatal flaw of authentication, even by the admission of the editors, is that Zhang Liang, despite his long cooperation with the editors, had steadfastly refused to give the editors the “original documents” he claimed to be in his possession. What he gave the editors were not facsimile of these documents, but mere *computer printouts*. Such an excuse should have set alarms bells ringing everywhere. Indeed, as early as 2001, China watcher [John Gittings](#) had already found this “terms of the game” “a shade naïve.”

Why did the editors settle on mere computer printouts, even though it was their “reputations that are on the line”? (Professor Schell’s words, p. 469). The editors’ own accounts are revealing, either interpreted literally or between the lines. Zhang Liang has clearly out maneuvered the editors.

Simply put, Zhang Liang was able to convince the editors that by passing on the reformatted computer printouts of the documents allowed him to stay within the bounds of patriotism, but to supply them with the “actual physical documents” would amount to betrayal (TP, pp. xix-xx, 472). Professor Nathan’s notes that Zhang Liang’s “seemingly arcane distinctions are not foreign” to US “political culture, which tacitly accepts the leaking of content but tends to prosecute the act of compromising sources or physical documents” (TP, p. xx). In his rejoinder to my critique, Professor Nathan staunchly defends Zhang Liang’s distinction and even raises the stakes by saying that “authentication using physical documents would have endangered the Compiler.” (p. 210).

In contrast, Professor Schell noted that Zhang Liang’s behavior seems “illogical”:

“It was the compiler’s fervent conviction that there was *an important distinction between passing actual physical documents and merely the reformatted contents* on to foreigners like us or to the world at large. This is a distinction and a sensitivity that was extremely important to the compiler for reasons that make sense in China but may seem illogical in the context of an open society, Nevertheless, they were the terms of this game, and we choose to respect them. After all, China has its own set of cultural and political imperatives that are not ours to judge for another who must live his own life in that system” (TP, pp. xx, 470, 472) (italics mine).

So won over by Zhang Liang that the editors even launched into long justifications of how Chinese style patriotism and loyalty to leaders helps explain why Zhang Liang harbors “strong feelings of loyalty when it comes to publishing classified documents and putting oneself into direct opposition to the state” (TP, p. 437)

This author is unaware of such a distinction in the long history of document leakages out of China. For China as for any other country, any disclosure of top-secret materials, in whatever form or shape, would be regarded as treasonous, especially in view of Beijing’s harsh espionage laws. For all intent and purposes, for Beijing, if Zhang Liang had actually revealed classified documents, whether they be original documents, facsimiles, or computer printouts, it would have amounted to high treason, just the same way Daniel Ellsberg and Julian Assange were charged over the Pentagon Papers and the Wikileaks.

Zhang Liang’s ability to mislead the editors is attested by Professor Schell’s cryptic statement that “the alternative to publication was to ignore this collection – in effect to yield to the Chinese Communist Party’s protective shield of secrecy” (TP, p. 474). I take it to mean that for him, there was no alternative but to accept Zhang Liang’s conditions – the deal was off if original documents had to be supplied. In reality, the only sensible thing to do for the editors was to demand the original documents for their project.

Now, twenty-three years after the publication of TS/TP, not a single original document has been made available for public scrutiny. No evidence exists that the editors have attempted to secure those original documents from Zhang Liang. Professor Nathan’s indifference about acquiring the originals is shown by his statement that he “would not have been able to conduct the chemical and other physical assays necessary to distinguish high-quality forged documents from real documents.” This sounds illogical. No one expects Professor Nathan personally to perform forensic or chemical and physical tests, which must be performed by experts. Important clues in the original documents would have helped to establish their authenticity.

Zhang Liang has reportedly settled in the United States, and the editors have never reported any harm done to his family and associates. In 2001, Professor Nathan said that there was a “need to maintain total secrecy” as they prepared TP (p. xx). This veil of secrecy is still being maintained today.

The inevitable conclusion is that Zhang Liang does not own any classified documents in the first place. And even according to the logic spelled out by Professor Schell's Afterward, the claims for authenticity of the top-secret documents in TS/TP should be regarded as null and void (please see later).

*Can Reconstructed Documents Be Authentic* In many incidences, Professor Nathan has admitted that the key and "never-before-published" documents were not "transcripts" recorded on the spot but were rather reconstructed by Zhang Liang long after the fact by combining different sources. For example, Professor Nathan describes how Zhang used the phantom documents to reconstruct most of the "classified documents."

"Since a given conversation is often described in several sources, the compiler has combined information to *reconstruct most of the accounts of conversations throughout the book*. Here, as in minutes, we use quotation marks, reflecting the fact that even though *these are not direct transcripts*, they were presented by immediate participants as authentic records and are often mutually corroborated (TP, p. xli; emphasis mine)."

Zhang's reconstruction "classified documents" are at best secondary sources, and there is really no sense even trying to authenticate them. Professor Nathan's assertion that these non-transcripts "were presented by immediate participants as authentic records and are often mutually corroborated" is puzzling. How could and would any immediate participants (China's top leaders) gather together to authenticate and corroborate what Zhang Liang's had concocted more than a decade after the fact?

Even if we grant that some internal speeches are published officially or obtained through reliable channels, ex post facto reconstructions by Zhang Liang by merging different versions made by the participants of the event under different contexts, purposes, and circumstances do not satisfy the requirement of authenticity. Nor do they satisfy the requirement for integrity, which refers to the documents' being complete and unaltered. We have no idea what sources Zhang used to reconstruct and combine the materials. There is a great deal of evidence that in TS he took a great deal of liberty by inserting fragments of conversations into different mouths by incorporating hearsay, personal views, and embellishments. He frequently interjects his own

interpretations and commentaries into the alleged factual documents, a practice that could only be called editorializing. Gaps in information were filled in with reconstructed materials.

Yet Professor Nathan uses these reconstructions to discuss who defers to whom, who speaks infrequently, who speaks briefly and how often they speak, as if they were actual taped conversations (TP, pp. xxx-xxxi). Indeed, the reconstructions of top-level speeches from 1989 are not unique to TS/TP, as examples abound in fictions, histories and memoirs of the era, but the outcomes are always wildly variable pastiches (please see below).

Further, in TS/TP, the editors are indifferent to problems of timing, sequencing, completeness, bias, accuracy, or the integrity of the documents, nor do they tell the readers which “never-before-published” documents were reconstructed nor what criteria were used. Also, in his rejoinder to my critique, Professor Nathan conceded squarely my point that the “classified documents” “*are not the same as direct transcripts*” (Italics mine). Yet, unable to counter my main points and especially my point that Zhang Liang’s reconstructions are really cut and paste jobs, Professor Nathan further lowered the bar by saying that “it is wrong to refer to the reconstruction as ‘cut and paste’ but if this term is appropriate, it would not affect the material’s authenticity” (p. 214) This definition of authenticity is unsatisfactory and can hardly be taken seriously.

I suppose that most journalists, academics, and college undergrads would appreciate the distinction between primary and secondary sources, and that reconstructed original documents is an oxymoron. But these are distinctions that the editors seem unable or unwilling to grasp.

Finally, the “minutes” presented in the June 2022 and 2024 issues of *Foreign Affairs* are much shorter versions of their counterparts in TP and some of the cuts are indicated by ellipses while others are not. Even in these abridged versions, readers will find that the style and tone of these “conversations” are stiff and artificial. Instead of exchanges of opinions and information, these people, a small intimate group in the Politburo plus the elders, appear to be making long and formal pronouncements, telling one another things they already knew. This betrays the reconstruction process of using diverse sources. True, there are very formal records of written opinions intended for the larger bureaucracy, but the “conversations” available in TS/TP are more akin to literary devices used in Chinese political fictions and histories.

## Professor's Schell's Revelations

One of the most formidable challenges to the claims of authenticity is actually Professor Schell's *Afterward* which was written as a hedge against the extravagant claims in TP. His views sharply contrast with Professor Nathan's assertions of authenticity and therefore merit lengthy reproductions. Professor Schell's discussion of the process of production also reveals how progressively the editors were outmaneuvered by Zhang Liang. and directly and indirectly negate any claims of authenticity. Professor Schell also tries to draw lessons from well-known forgeries by identifying the pitfalls, but ironically, he actually revealed how the editors might have fallen into the traps.

In his warnings about documents with "uncertain pedigrees" and "murky provenience" (pp. 462-463), Professor Schell has actually maintained the consistent view that TS/TP *cannot be authenticated*, and that the editors did not have the wherewithal to do so. Professor Schell said this of TS/TP:

- "it must be emphasized again that we still have no basis for proclaiming their authenticity with absolute authority" p. 470
- ". . .we cannot guarantee that these minutes, for instance, are as accurate as the Pentagon Papers or the transcripts of U.S. presidential conversations recorded during the Watergate era."
- ". . .no one outside of China can completely vouch for the authenticity of these transcripts . . ." 474
- "the barrier between us and the documents is, alas, still real"; "Inevitably, then, blank spaces must remain both in the fabric of authentication and in the corroborating narrative . . ." (p. 474).
- "After all, the manuscripts we had been given to work with consisted not of original documents, or even facsimile copies, but of a printout of a computer transcription of original materials."

Professor Schell's caution also led him to draw lessons from a long history of secret documents that have proven to be forgeries, from Sir Edmund Backhouse's *Jing Shan Diaries* to

Hugh Trevor-Roper's *The Last Days of Hitler* (p. 461). According to Professor Schell, the Jing Shan diary, which describes behind-the-scenes power politics within the imperial government during the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 was eventually dismissed as a fake when the author, after years of demurring, failed to provide documentary records. The "inability and unwillingness" of the author to surrender the original documents finally doomed the Jing Shan diary as a "masterful but brazen forgery" (TP, p. 462.) Professor Schell said,

"... soon some China experts were asking to see the complete documentary record, which Blackhouse promised but failed to provide. Year after year, he kept demurring, until in 1936 Blackhouse finally backed off completely from his earlier promise, lamenting that he had been forced to sell the diary due to penury several years earlier. In view of Blackhouse's inability or unwillingness to surrender the original documents, it was not surprising that the credibility of the Jing Shan diary began to erode. As more and more experts began to suspect and then attack its murky provenance . . . the Jing Shan diary came to be regarded as a masterful but brazen forgery." (p. 462)

On another book of questionable authenticity, Yaoming Le's *the Conspiracy and Death of Lin Biao*, Professor Schell quotes a critic by saying that few readers "have taken this version seriously, chiefly because the sources which Yao claimed to have exclusive access to, were never made available to others" (p. 466). It is a great irony that history is repeating itself that more than two decades after the publication of TS/TP, Zhang Liang has not revealed a single original document for forensic scrutiny, despite the repeated challenges. Neither have his editors provided a single page of their computer printout. The editors have never said a word about pressing Zhang Liang for the original documents, even though Zhang Liang appears to have been already safely ensconced in the United States. The editors have not reported any harm done to Zhang Liang's family and associates but continue to use the safety issue (as in this latest compilation) to hide Zhang's identity and his documents.

A final but important point has to be noted. Although Professor Nathan's long introduction is translated in TS, Professor Schell's revealing Afterward is not translated in TS. Therefore, Chinese readers who do not read English would not have been able to grasp the significance of what Professor Schell has to offer. Space should not be a concern, since Chinese characters are compact, as the two volumes of TS (measuring 5.5 x 8.25 inches) which supposedly containing three times as much material as TP is only about 0.5 inch thicker than TP

(6.5 x 9.5 inches). The withholding of the Afterward makes no sense. Did the editors understand that the large number of Chinese Tiananmen historians, writers, and former participants such as workers and students who have intimate knowledge of the primary and secondary sources would easily see through the artifice? This adds to the list of discrepancies between TS and TP.

It is clear that even the various accounts by Professors Nathan and Schell on TS/TP are more than sufficient to disprove any claims of authenticity and to show why they ended up with just the computer printout versions of the phantom classified document. Professor Schell's statement that they "were taken by the complier on a curious odyssey" (TP, p. 470) seems ironic.

In the final analysis, despite Professor Nathan's strong assertions and diversions, the claim of authenticity simply cannot be sustained. The murky provenience, the editors' admission that the classified documents were reconstructed long after the fact, and above all, the inability to produce even one original document 23 years after publication for open scrutiny, lend support to this view. The editors cannot explain away contradictions such as the differences in claims of authenticity, translation, citation and style in TS/TP. Professor Nathan's woolly understanding of the meaning of authenticity and the difference between primary and secondary sources is for all to see. Professor Schell's Afterward on frauds provides even more insights and evidence on why the "top secret documents" contained in TS/TP are not real. They certainly do not deserve the authoritative status claimed by the editors. It must also be restated that we do not question the many documents contained in TS/TP already in the public realm. Our focus is on the classified Chinese documents of decision-making at the very top, the alleged Politburo minutes and transcripts of private conversations among Chinese leaders. In reaction to my criticism, Professor Nathan tried to lump the two together to defend himself. Further, despite all the admissions, Professor Nathan continues to claim that his documents are "transcripts," as he has done in the introductions to the 2022 and 2024 compilation in *Foreign Affairs*. The need to get to the bottom of the matter is still urgent.

## **Revelations by An Earlier Participant of the Tiananmen Papers Project**

At one point, Professor Nathan said that not even the other editors were allowed certain secrets because he had to withhold information from them to protect Zhang (TP, p. xx). Even up

to today he has not divulged this secret which may be hidden forever. One secret, however, is known. After Professor Nathan responded to my critique with a rejoinder in 2004, Zhang Liang, on the other hand, launched a vituperative and personalized attack on me, posted in six installments, on the *Duowei news* net in June 2004. Zhang Liang's diatribe is vulgar and I have translated some of them on [pp. 3-4 in my re-rejoinder](#). Zhang also boasted that upon receiving my manuscript, *the China Quarterly*, out of respect for Professor Nathan and himself, consulted them on whether or not to publish the manuscript. Professor Nathan supposedly then sought the opinion of Zhang, who in turn made three demands; that *China Quarterly* publish my article, that Professor Nathan would write a rebuttal, and that I should translate my article into Chinese, so that Zhang could write a rebuttal. *The China Quarterly*, according to him, "fully" accepted all three of his proposals. This is spurious, as the blind referee process which *China Quarterly* follows, as all academics know, does not work this way. The *China Quarterly* accepted my article on the recommendations of three anonymous referees, and never demanded that I translate my article into Chinese. However, all this is a good reflection of aspects of Zhang's character. Regrettably, none of Zhang's collaborators have so far said whether they agree with him or not.

In any case, Zhang Liang's diatribe prompted Jin Zhong, a veteran China analyst and editor-in-chief and publisher of Hong Kong's *Kaifang*, a Chinese affairs magazine, to write a tell-all article in the July 2004 issue of his magazine entitled "[Zhang liang and His June 4<sup>th</sup> Story](#)." (Please see [appendix 1](#)) Jin was repulsed by Zhang's misrepresentations and by his ad hominem attack on me. According to Jin, he met Professor Nathan in June, 1998, in Hong Kong and was invited to spend a week at Professor Nathan's home in New York in October 1998 to pore over the unfinished TS book manuscript (which chronicles the event up to May 1989), to advise on marketing and promotional issue and to see if he could help publish it in time for the tenth anniversary of the Tiananmen events in June 1999. What Jin saw, however, was not the sensitive and electrifying secret documents later touted by the editors. As he said, it is not easy to obtain internal CCP documents, and who wouldn't jump at the sight of 2,000 of them. Yet, at the time he found Zhang's book manuscript unexciting, the material un-explosive, and the documents quite ordinary. He never saw the alleged minutes of the meetings of the Elders, of the Politburo, of the Politburo's Standing Committee, and the secret conversations of top leaders. Jin's view can be corroborated by comments from Zhang, Professors Nathan and Link, and He Pin (publisher of Mirror Books) themselves at various press conferences describing negative and

pessimistic reactions to marketability that greeted the book manuscript at the beginning, when it was rejected by knowledgeable Taiwanese and Hong Kong publishers. (onf file)

Jin Zhong's negotiation with Professor Nathan broke down, and one reason was Zhang's demand for US\$154,000 (based on an estimate sale of 100,000 copies) as remuneration, without which Zhang said that he would rather abandon publication. Jin had to decline because even the bestselling Chinese political books published in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the diasporas, according to his experience, did not sell more than a few thousand copies.

Before he washed his hands of the project he offered some advice – that the material on the top-level decision-making process needed to be highlighted to make the book more readable and that TP should be published before TS in order to lend legitimacy to the project. In his capacity as an editor, Jin Zhong also advised Zhang Liang to trim the descriptions of the local situations and foreign reactions, to discuss the provenance of the documents, to give a biographical background of Zhang, and to discuss the archival system of the CCP. Jin did not expect Zhang to reconstruct/fabricate “authentic” documents.

Significantly, [Professor Nathan's reply to Jin Zhong](#) never denied what Jin had said, although he chided him for breaking the pledge of silence about the meeting with Zhang Liang (please see appendix 2). This gives strong support to the view, including mine, that the top secret classified documents were constructed after the Jin Zhong meeting. Jin's disclosure is damaging to the credibility of the authors and more will be discussed later.

## **The Editors' Unfamiliarity with the Available Sources**

In the following we delve deeper to explore the faulty research process (a process which lasted several years according to Nathan), assumptions and how they impact the errors in judgement by the editors. At various instances, the editors assert that the TS/TP “possess an internal coherence, richness, and human believability that would be almost impossible to fake”; that “it is hard to imagine a means of creating a plausible forgery at such a deep level of detail.” (p. xx, 470); have provided the “richest record” they have “ever seen of political life in China at the top . . .” (xxix), and “much of it would appear to be virtually impossible to reconstruct by any conceivable research effort.” (p. xx). Further, they assert that

“It would appear to be virtually impossible to reconstruct by any conceivable research effort” and that “no absolute collaboration of the Tiananmen papers could be made by checking archives or interview sources” (p. 461). The editor might have really felt this way, but unfortunately, these views are wrong in view of the massive evidence.

Because of the intrinsic importance of the Tiananmen events which drew world-wide attention, and the hundreds of journalists and foreign observers, not to mention the hundreds of thousands of participants, who gathered in Beijing, a vast volume of literature exists. Minute details, day-to-day and even hour-on-hour developments, on the subject have been described in the large body of books and documents in both English and Chinese. A quick search on the subject Tiananmen Square Incident 1989 in the Hollis catalogue at Harvard University returns 263 books and films in Chinese from 1989 to 2000, the year before the publication of TS/TP. This does not include the hundreds of items on Chinese history and politics, memoirs, biographies, yearbooks, etc., that also include discussions of Tiananmen affairs. After 2011, this literature continues to grow.

Some context is necessary. Those who work closely with Chinese archives cannot have failed to recognize an irony in Chinese secret and internal documents. In China, access to information is tightly controlled, as even the most common information will often be labelled secret, but many documents stamped "top secret" can be found on the Internet and in research libraries all over the West. Every day a stream of documents from different ministries, provinces and agencies flows into the Party and state headquarters in Zhongnanhai, but a parallel flow (including full or partially secret documents) moves in the other direction down the administrative ladder to reveal, explain and justify government policies and propaganda. The huge size of the bureaucracy also means that the number of people having access to transmitted documents is correspondingly large and leakage is always high, particularly in the face of hungry demands from overseas media and intelligence services. Often so much is classified secret or internal that local authorities lose sense of what is important and what is not, and over time much is simply discarded. During the reform period, local officials even attempted to peddle duffle bags of documents to overseas libraries for a price (information supplied by colleagues at the Universities Services Centre, Chinese University of Hong Kong). Such information fuels a vast body of political and historical writings that encompass popular histories, biographies, novels

and "report literature" published in China and the diaspora. The best of these are serious and reliable works based on interviews, investigative journalism and careful analyses; the worst are pure sensationalism, speculations, sheer fantasies or forgeries. Many authors claim privileged access to official archives, and by weaving together official documents, chronologies, statistics, memoirs by former politicians, hearsay and a large dose of imagination, they dramatize politics at the top by recounting events in minute detail. Many such writings include fly-on-the-wall dialogue and descriptions of the thoughts of the protagonists. And because of a relaxed Chinese cultural attitude toward originality, they seldom acknowledge their sources, and it is fair game to copy verbatim from them, and from one another, with impunity. Ironically, hundreds of books belonging to this genre were published by Mirror Books, TS's publisher. This context is necessary to situate TS and TP in their proper context.

Most of the available Tiananmen materials, which are available in North American libraries, are familiar to Western scholars. For instance, June 4 scholar Professor Timothy Brook, in his 2011 review of TP, states that "most of what is in the dossier repeats or fits with what we already know." In any case, up to 2001 (the publication date of TS/TP), these materials, which run to thousands of pages, fall roughly into four categories, and I will cite a few examples:

1. Detailed daily and hourly chronicles of events in Beijing and the provinces published by the Chinese government for both internal and external uses:
  - *Fifty-Six Terrifying Days: A Daily Record of Events from 4 April to 9 June 1989*. Beijing: 1989, 231p.;
  - *Remembrance and Reflections on the 50 Days* (Beijing: 1989) 199 p.;
  - *Major Events Over 70 Days: From the Death of Hu Yaobang to the Dismissal of Zhao Ziyang*. Beijing, 1990, 107 p.;
2. Memoirs by participants:
  - Bao Zunxin, *The Inside Story of June Fourth: The Unfinished Nirvana*. Taipei: 1997, 199 p.;
3. Histories of the movement:

- Ding Wang. *Before and After 4 June*. Taipei: 1995, 2 vols., 320 pp. and 296 pp.
  - Chen Xiaoya, *The Crisis at Tiananmen: A History of the June Fourth Democratic Movement*. Taipei: 1996, 523 p.;
  - Pang Pang, *Beijing City Dripping in Blood: From the Death of Hu Yaobang to the Tragedy at Tiananmen*. Taipei: 1989, 143 p. (also available in English translation);
  - Chen Yizi, *China: The Ten Years of Reform and the 1989 Democracy Movement, the Background to the Slaughter During 4 June*. Taipei: 1990, 216 p.;
4. Collections of documents edited by Taiwan or Hong Kong organizations:
- Zhang Jingyu, *The Blood of Freedom, the Flower of Democracy*. Taipei, 1989, 216 p.;
  - Han Shanbi, *The Wounds of History: A Collection of Historical Materials on the 1989 Democracy Movement in China*, 2 volumes. Hong Kong, 1989, 2 v. 526 p.;
  - *The Truth of Fire and Blood: A Documentary on the Pro-democracy Movement in Mainland China 1989*. Taipei: 1989, 1,416 pp.

One important fact, never mentioned by the editors, is that even several internal speeches made by Deng Xiaoping during 1989 had already been published openly in his *Selected Works* vol. 3 (Beijing: 1993) in both Chinese and [English translations](#). These include private conversations with Chinese leaders (May 31, June 16, September 4), a speech with martial law troops in Beijing (June 9), and so on. Ding Wang's collection of documents include key speeches made by Deng, Li Peng, Yang Shangkun, in addition to Li Peng's report at the Fourth Plenum of the Thirteenth Central Committee and Zhao's Ziyang's defense at the same meeting. The large body of literature contains numerous documents and discussions of decision-making at China's apex of power during 1989 which involved the elders, although the editors seemed unaware of it.

The prior existence of this vast body of literature invalidates the editors' claims that the so-called classified documents contained in TS/TP are, 1) "never-before published" and "virtually impossible to reconstruct by any conceivable research effort"; 2) are so sensitive that the preparation and presentation of these volumes required "total secrecy," and 3) intended for "a

tiny handful of people in China” and that even “Jiang Zemin cannot surreptitiously examine” (p. xvii, xx-xxi, xxviii). After reading my critique in the *China Quarterly*, Professor Nathan asked Zhang Liang’s assistance to go through nine of these sources. Professor Nathan was evasive and did not concede my point that the editors arrived at these faulty assumptions because of their unawareness of these most important source materials, especially those by Ding Wang and Chen Xiaoya. Instead, he concluded that “82.3 percent of the documents transcribed in whole or in part in TS are not available from any other source” (rejoinder, p. 208). But my point is not that everything from TS/TP can be found in existing sources because that is impossible. Zhang Liang might have brought out sources that are unavailable in the West. My point is that the existence of these materials, and the editors’ unfamiliarity with them, have invalidated Professor Nathan’s several assumptions listed at the beginning of this section.

One academic convention is that when researchers begin a project, such as a master or doctoral thesis, for example, they are required to conduct a literature review of existing materials to show their familiarity with the subject, to avoid duplicating existing information, and to advance further. Without such preparations, they would be deemed unqualified. In this vein, one glaring omission in TS/TP is the apparent neglect of the mountain of memoirs, documentary collections, dramatized histories, which encompass both primary and secondary sources.

In 2001, the editors either ignored or were unaware of this mountain of materials because in TS/TP they said nary a word about it to the readers until Professor Nathan read my critique. If they had consulted these materials, it is their responsibility to inform the readers in a bibliography. But no bibliography exists in TS or TP. Additionally, much of these materials were published in the diaspora in the United States, Hong Kong and Taiwan and therefore they use the traditional and complicated characters which even mainlanders often find difficult to read. The editors might believe that the TAMP were unique so that they did not bother to refer to these materials. Yet, since the editors present their books as senior academics, this omission is no trivial matter. If they had done a literature review, they would not have made statements like those at the beginning of this section. They would have fortified themselves against the untrustworthy Zhang Liang. This extremely rich body of archives has also been drawn on by many writers to write a whole genre of histories, fictions, report literature, and the like. It is clear Zhang had a large pool of information from which he could construct and reconstruct his “top-

secret” documents. In fact, numerous identical or near-identical passages from TS, including the so-called “never-see-before minutes,” can readily be found long before the publication of TS/TP.

### **Hu Yaobang’s Collapse and Death, April 8, 1989**

The description of the collapse and death of Hu Yaobang in TS/TP is a good case in point to show 1) how Zhang Liang had drawn on an existing work, Pang Pang’s *The Death of Hu Yaobang*, an unabashedly fictional account (completed with dialogue) published in 1989, to recreate “never-before-released” classified documents after Jin Zhong’s meeting. It also shows 2) how TS, a narrative documentary history, has been transformed by the editors into TP, pure documents with annotations, one for the Chinese and the other for English readers. In TS, the relevant section makes no reference to any documentary sources (p. 107) and almost near the end it says “according to the records of the Central Staff Office (p. 110). In TP (pp. 20-22), this section is billed as a classified “document” with a grand and phony title that reads “ participants’ notes of an oral report given by Wen Jiabao, in his role as secretary of Party Committees of units under Party Central and director of the Party Central Office to the senior working staff of those offices, and of an oral report given by Luo Gan in his capacity as secretary general of the State Council and secretary of Party Committees in ministry-level state organizations, to senior staff of those offices.” Intriguingly, the first part of Zhang’s dramatized narrative in TS (pp. 107-109) is transformed into a formal document in TP (pp. 20-23), whereas the second part of this narrative (pp. 109-110) is rendered in TP in the-so-called bridging material. The subjective has been transformed into the objective. Zhang’s more dramatic narrative statements (such as his reading of the minds of the participants) which intercepted this section are omitted and not translated in TP to give it an objective gloss.

Pang Pang’s version reads (pp. 9-10):

9:40 a.m. . .

Forty minutes into the meeting, Hu Yaobang feels stifled.

He later told his family that the subject of education was what made him feel bad early in the meeting. China's educational system is crippled by poor performance. The army of illiteracy is

preparing for conquest. China is at a critical moment. Hu is worried as well as upset. He used to feel like this when he was worried and upset, but that feeling would subside after a while.

Later he finds that it is worse than he thought. Something heavy is crushing his heart. It rolls unstopably, like a T-34 tank. He feels dizzy. Then dizziness is replaced by numbness. He feels like a strange kind of bloodsucker is draining the blood from his brain.

He is pale.

Politburo members sitting nearby notice there's something wrong with Hu Yaobang. One of them later said, "From the meeting's start I saw that Hu looked ill. He looked worse and worse as the meeting went on. I should have reminded him earlier to go take a rest."

Hu can no longer hold out. He stands and waves to catch the eye of General Secretary Zhao Ziyang. One witness said later that it looked as if Hu was saluting Zhao.

"Comrade Ziyang," Hu says, "may I have your permission to leave..." Before he can finish, he slides into his chair with his eyes closed.

Sitting next to Hu is Defense Minister Qin Jiwei. He immediately holds Hu in his arms. At this moment, all eyes turn toward Hu Yaobang. Since his resignation, Politburo members have never given Hu Yaobang such attention.

Hu Qili makes the first assessment. "Hold it! It is probably a heart attack."

Zhao Ziyang asks loudly, "Who has nitroglycerine?"

"I have," answers Jiang Zemin, Shanghai's Party boss! He never brings his medicine with him, but it was God's design that his wife insisted that he bring it to Beijing this time.

"I've never had any heart trouble," he protested. "Bring it in case of emergency," she said.

The emergency does occur, but it doesn't strike him. Jiang gets the medicine out of his pocket immediately, shaking it.

Hu Qili grabs it, asking how it is administered.

Jiang Zemin is at a loss. This is the first time he has ever carried the medicine, and he does not know how to use it.

Song Ping comes over. "I know how to use it," he says.

Qin Jiwei and Hu Qili put the unconscious man on the floor. Song Ping puts two tablets into Hu Yaobang's mouth.

Hu regains consciousness gradually, vomiting.

Zhao Ziyang calls for a doctor.

There is no doctor to be found.

What negligence! What a pity! There is no medical staff present at such an important meeting. China's leaders are the world's oldest. Every leader is a dilapidated machine which could break down at any moment. A health problem afflicting any of them will make an army of medical experts helpless . . .

At 4 p.m. Hu is moved to Beijing Hospital.

In TS (pp. 106ff) and TP (pp. 20ff), this is rendered as a “never-before-seen” and confidential Politburo document:

**At 9 A.M. on April 8, in Qinzheng Hall at Zhongnanhai, Zhao Ziyang chaired a Politburo meeting to discuss views on a document called "Central Committee Decision on Certain Questions on Educational Development and Reform (Draft)." Hu Yaobang, although relieved of his position as Party general secretary in January 1987, remained as a member of the Politburo and attended this meeting. Commissioner of Education Li Tieying briefed the members.**

During this briefing, Hu Yaobang sat with a pinched look. Minister of Defense Qin Jiwei later recalled, "I sensed something wrong about Comrade Yaobang from the time the meeting opened. His face was ashen. But he was straining to keep up appearances." About three quarters of an hour into the meeting, as Li Tieying was reviewing the education budgets of recent years, Hu appeared to be fading. He rose to request permission to leave. But as soon as he rose to his feet, he collapsed back into his chair.

"Comrade Ziyang . . ." His voice broke off as his hand faltered in the air describing a semicircle. Everyone present, caught by surprise, stood up and stared at the ashen-faced Hu. "It's probably a heart attack. . . . Don't move him!" someone said. "Anyone have nitroglycerin?" Zhao Ziyang asked urgently.

"I do!" It was Qin Jiwei, who also had a heart condition. He took two pills from his briefcase and put them into Hu Yaobang's mouth. Then to Hu Qili, who came rushing over, he said, "Hurry and lay Comrade Yaobang on the floor." Hu slowly opened his eyes as staff members telephoned Liberation Army Hospital 305, which was only a block from Zhongnanhai. Paramedics were on the scene in about ten minutes. That afternoon, after Hu's condition had improved slightly, he was transferred to Beijing Hospital for observation.

## **Another Set of “Top-Secret” Documents**

The pattern of processing repeats with another set of alleged top-secret internal Chinese documents, Zong Hairen's *Disidai* (*The Fourth Generation*) (hereafter, *Disidai*) and its English translation titled *China's New Rulers: The Secret Files* (2002) (hereafter, *Secret Files*) edited by Professors Nathan and Bruce Gilley. This time, the editors tell the readers that top-secret documents were supplied by another Chinese author writing under the alias Zong Hairen allegedly consisting of classified Organization Department investigative reports on top leaders to be used during the leadership changeover just prior to the Sixteenth Party Congress of 2002 (pp. 23ff). They also tell the readers that instead of working with original documents, Zong merely possess “working drafts” of these documents. In the book, the editors said they have “selected, rearranged, restated and explained” Zong's material and “added historical and institutional information that is not mentioned in Zong's book” (p. 29)

By coincidence, *China Journal*, another top publication in the field of China studies, asked me to review both *Disidai* and *Secret Files*. The outcome is my [review entitled “China's Fourth Generation: The New Rulers and the Secret Files” in the July 2003 issue of the \*China Journal\*](#). Professor Nathan and Gilley's [Response](#) also appear in the same issue. These editors again strongly vouch for the authenticity of the classified dossiers with Professor Nathan's woolly understanding of the term. In my review, I demonstrate that the claim of authenticity

cannot be established, and as with the case of TS/TP, the Chinese and English versions display different claims of provenance, translation, citation, style and presentation. Interested readers may consult these articles if they can go past the paywall and I will highlight a few points here.

In *Secret Files*, the editors give contradictory versions of provenance. Despite the admission that they only possess “working drafts” of the original documents, Professors Nathan and Gilley talk as if they had possessed the original documents. They claim that these dossiers “are highly confidential, prepared for the exclusive use of the members of the outgoing Politburo . . .” and were not even shown to Central Committee members. (pp. 23-24) At one point, they told the readers that Zong was a legitimate conduit through which top Chinese leaders, who presumably had no fear of charges of treason or diverging of state secrets, supplied Zong with the sensitive documents:

“In late 2001, as preparations for the succession intensified, persons in Beijing decided to reveal the content of the reports to the outside world. Substantial portions of the dossiers on each candidate, still in draft form, were conveyed to a Chinese writer outside China whom the officials in Beijing trusted. They asked that he use the dossiers as the basis of a book that would tell the world the inside story of new rulers.” (pp. 3-4)

The idea that top Chinese officials would reveal classified materials on the internal appraisals of top leaders detailing their accomplishments and faults during a sensitive period of political succession to Westerners flies in the face of our knowledge of Chinese politics. This is just not credible. Still less is the claim that they chose Professor Nathan as the recipient, since he has already been (regrettably) declared persona non grata after the publication of TS/TP in 2001. Indeed, later on, Professors Nathan and Gilley contradict themselves by suggesting another role for Zong, that of a dissident or whistle-blower who fears for his security for leaking state secrets.

“Unfortunately, in order to protect Zong’s security we cannot give the details of his background and personal conduct that have led us to conclude that he is trustworthy” (p. 32)

Apart from this contradiction, the editors’ version of a windfall of documents from the very top Chinese leadership is blatantly contradicted by Zong’s more reserved and believable account. According to Zong, research and preparation of the book was a torturous and

complicated process with many twists and turns. At first, he was reluctant to write a book on the new leaders. On the one hand, he feared that Beijing might become suspicious of him, and accuse him of exposing state secrets and libeling Party and state leaders. On the other hand, he was concerned that readers outside of China might think that a book like this was designed merely to flatter the Chinese leadership. In the end, a concern that the leaders were attracting considerable international attention while internal evaluations of them were still state secrets changed his mind. Yet, even when he finally decided to write, the "greatest difficulty" he encountered was the dearth of materials, because they needed to be verifiable and come from internal and high-level sources, such as investigative reports of the preparatory group for the 16th Party Congress, personnel dossiers of the Organization Department, and other collaborating materials. Only his determination, he says, overcame a research process filled with surprises. (Disidai, pp. 3-4)

In contrast with the editors' exaggerated claim, this more modest version is more credible, especially when it is directed at the Chinese readers. Unable to explain the contradictions, Professors Nathan and Gilley, in their rejoinder to my critique, brush aside the issues by claiming that "We did not see any 'contrast' and 'inconsistency' between Zong's account and ours." (p. 123)

Readers interested in the issues of provenance and authenticity of Disidai/Secret Files. may refer to my critique and the response in the *China Journal*. They may also refer to my 2005 re-rejoinder mentioned above. Overall, in considering TS/TP and Disidai/Secret Files together, the modus operandi of Professor Nathan and his collaborators are clear. They

- make extravagant claims and assert authenticity for their documents, often in contrast with the Chinese versions with much more modest claims;
- dismiss the numerous contradictions in the claims of authenticity, translation, citation and style, in the Chinese and English versions as editorial decisions or choices;
- claim that the publication of original document would hurt the security of Chinese authors;
- bank on their reputation and the fact that few readers are able to fact check the Chinese versions written in traditional complicated Chinese characters;
- claim that there are no archival records or other sources for comparison;

- publish excerpts of TP repeatedly until it is finally accepted even with the inability/unwillingness to produce one single original document;
- muddle the issues by presenting Zhang Liang and Zong Hairen as two different persons (see below).

Two additional issues merit attention. First, we can detect a pattern during the process of transformation of narrative histories and historical fiction into pure secret documents whereby the role of the original author has either been downgraded or disappeared altogether. For instance, Zhang Liang is listed squarely as the author of TS, but in its metamorphosis into TP, allegedly a collection of documents, his role has been downgraded into being a “compiler.” The case of *Disidai/Secret Files* is also noteworthy. Zong Hairen is listed as the author of *Disidai*, but in *Secret Files* Zong’s name disappeared altogether from the front page to be replaced by the names of editors Professors Nathan and Gilley, whose primary role was that of translators and annotators. Does this raise the issue of the expropriation of intellectual property?

Second, it is known within a small circle that Zhang Liang and Zong Hairen are one and the same person writing under two aliases. Jin Zhong had dealt with this person and published his articles in Open magazine. A [2003 US Congressional report \(One hundred Eighth Congress, first Session](#), October 2), pp. 9 and 89 (n. 9) states as well that Zhang Liang writes under the pseudonym Zong Hairen. This fact opens up even more issues. Professors Nathan and Gilley have repeatedly claimed that concerns for safety have precluded the yielding of any information about the background of Zong. As they said, they “cannot give the details of his background and personal conduct that have led us to conclude that his is trustworthy.” (*Secret Files*, p. 32)

In TP, the editors portray Zhang Liang as a courageous dissident whose act of smuggling top-secret documents out of China is still a safety concern for him, his family, and colleagues. In *Secret Files*, the editors portray Zong as a trusted conduit for top Chinese leaders to channel highly sensitive top-secret files to the editors at one point, but at another point, he is said to be concerned with his security, presumably for leaking sensitive materials. Since Zhang and Zong are one and the same person, this raises many unanswered issues.

## Conclusion

The real story of the Tiananmen Papers is now complete. Because of the extraordinary claims of the editors of TP and the importance of the subject, there is a general consensus that authenticity should be a prime concern. Let's be very clear: the documents contained in TP that are in the public domain and that can be verified are not in question. Our focus is on the alleged Politburo minutes and transcripts of private conversation among China's top leaders. There ought not be any ambiguity.

I may be accused of being uncollegial in offering such a thorough dissection of TS/TP, but I perfectly agree with the editors' that the "loyalty to the truth of history" (p. xix) is paramount. Again, with great respect for their reputation and scholarship, Professors Nathan and Schell should be given credit for keeping the issues alive by their writings, but authentic and accurate primary sources are critical for credible historical scholarship to ward off the dangers of false narratives and misinformation.

It is high time to bring the long-standing debate on the authenticity of the "classified documents" on top-level decision-making to a close. Twenty-three years have passed since the publication of TS/TP, not a single original document allegedly in the possession of Zhang Liang has been opened for forensic tests, and the inevitable conclusion is that he does not have them. All things considered, no credible evidence exists to establish the authenticity of TS/TP, especially since Professors Nathan, Link, and Schell have worked only with computer printouts, not the alleged classified documents owned by Zhang Liang who refused to turn them over to the editors. The lack of grounds to ascertain authenticity is actually a simple issue – even Professor Schell has conceded as much in TP, and he is right in this regard. This also applies to many of Professor Nathan's own admissions. Perhaps some would agree with the view that "in the absence of any true information, even palpably false information will always appear as the next best thing" (quoted by Professor Schell in TP, p. 464). However, the editors present their research as senior academics, and we expect a higher standard. Professor Nathan's representation of the documents as "transcripts" is misleading. His insistence on woolly conceptions of authenticity may render a disservice to the field of China studies and set a poor example for students and the general public.

This author, not a Tiananmen event specialist, is interested in Chinese history and politics and methodology. More recently, scholars and publishers have exercised more caution when they come to “classified” materials. For instance, the publication of the memoirs of Zhao Ziyang, in both Chinese and English, is supported by real taped recordings. A selection of documents on the Fourth Plenum of 1989 in Chinese (with a foreword by Professor Nathan) presents the documents in facsimiles, eschewing extravagant claims, reconstruction and tempering. Progress has been made.

Keywords: The Tiananmen Papers; 1989 events in China; authentication of historical documents; forgeries;

Appendix 1: Jin Zhong, “Zhang Liang and His June 4<sup>th</sup> Story” (張良和他的六四故事)

Appendix 2: Andrew Nathan, “A Reply to Jin Zhong’s June 4<sup>th</sup> Story” (回覆金鐘的六四故事)



# 海外中國研究的一段秘辛

# 張良和他的六四故事

念六四慘案十五週年時，美國學術界發生一場爭議，加拿大學者 Alfred L.

· Chan 陳教授在《中國季刊》上發表文章對黎安友、張良主編的《天安門文件》的真實性提出質疑。鑒於《中國季刊》是一個很有學術地位的英文刊物，黎安友教授作了答覆，張良則在多維網連載六篇反駁文章。為此，香港南華早報專欄作家秦家驄來電訪問，後來陳教授也和我通了電話，他們都問過我的意見。我覺得可以借此機會，把我參與過張良《六四真相》的早期出版情況，和我的有關意見寫出來，讓讀者加以審視，因為這本書的出版已造成一個很大範圍政治影響的事件。我參與其事是一九九八年，該書出版在二〇〇一年，雖然熱潮已過，往事並不如煙，不少記錄和資料可以彌補記憶的不足。

## 張良對北美學者的傲慢態度

我想先談談對最近張良反駁陳教授的看法。其實，早在二〇〇一年五月下旬，香港星島日報就發表過署名「蕭何」的對《中國六四真

，陳教授與蕭何的方法，正是常用的方法之一。香港研究中共文件者不計其數，有幾個是「有資格」像張良自稱可以去中辦等機要部門「

相》的質疑，蕭何自稱是張良的夥伴，他們在北京曾一道收集資料，準備出一本關於八九學運始末的書，以還原歷史真相。在資料收集上，他們有分工，但後來張良將資料全部帶出國，出了這本書。然後，蕭何指出，書中若干不實、拼湊的部份決非中共內部文件，是「精心編寫的政治小說」。張良當時的反駁指稱蕭何

●編者按：本刊主編參與影響很大的張良《六四真相》一書前期出版經過，對該書引發的爭議，有參考價值，也為一些朋友所關注，現特撰文，披露若干不為人知的內情。

是羅幹手下一名御用「安全人員」，他的朋友中沒一個自稱蕭何的朋友，他要蕭何亮出張良的真實身份以證明其言可信。

這次，張良對陳教授的反駁，一仍舊章，指陳「完全沿襲三年前蕭何的方法，只不過比蕭何更拙劣」，主要論點完全來自蕭何，自己起碼的判斷都沒有，對「中國高層政治一竅不

的『學術目的，是否還有一定的政治背景和政治企圖。』

通」。張良進一步指稱，「蕭何是羅幹親自掛帥成立的追查《真相》的中央專案組」。

張良最重要的反駁是，列舉許多中共打壓《六四真相》的措施與現象，江澤民李鵬「如臨大敵」，「如果這本書沒有擊中要害，中共高層不可能作出如此過度的反應……這足以證明：此書的權威性是建立在披露許多國家機密的基礎上的。」

張良這種反駁手法並不公平。他指陳沿襲蕭何的手法是甚麼呢？「他先是比较《天安门文件》與《中國六四真相》的異同，企圖找出兩書與已出版的海內外一些關於六四書籍的某些片斷的相類似之處，推論出此書是抄襲已出版的一些書籍」，張良貶斥說，蕭何還看過一些內部文件，「而陳甚麼內部文件都沒有資格看。」這種沒有看過文件的研究方法有「致命缺陷」。

照張良這一說法，任何人也不可能評論他的書的真實性，因為他引用的文件全不公開，誰也看不到，包括肯定他的書也照樣沒有根據。其實，研究一本書的資料可信性，方法很多。

的動機，「只是希望自己堅定地站在江澤民李鵬羅幹等人一邊，替他們說話。」

張良傲慢地宣稱：「是的，A·Chan太

，陳教授與蕭何的方法，正是常用的方法之一。香港研究中共文件者不計其數，有幾個是「有資格」像張良自稱可以去中辦等機要部門「調閱檔案」的？

Alfred L. Chan即陳仲禮博士，是加拿大西安大略大學曉朗學院政治系副教授。他告訴我，張良在反駁中有許多人身攻擊。這也是我讀張良反駁文章的感覺。張良文章開始就要求陳先生告訴他中文名，並提交他在《中國季刊》的文章的「母語中文」本，他說「迄今為止，這位作者既不敢將他的英文稿用中文寫出，也不敢告訴他的中文名。」

「[是真正的膽怯和懦弱]。」這是非常無理的違背常識的指控。眾所周知，華人在外國使用英文名是理所當然的事，用英文寫作發表在知名的刊物上，就是他的文章的正本，任何人可以據以評議。張良有甚麼權利要求一位北美學者以中文名與中文發表文章？張良反復指陳仲禮為「自己在加拿大大學學術界撈取學術名份」，「作為一名學術界默默無名之輩，我理解，A. Chan企圖通過挑戰黎安友和《天安門文件》等書來達到他的學術目的，當然，我也懷疑他除了『純粹

的『學術目的，是否還有一定的政治背景和政洽企圖。』

在反駁之三的結尾，張良指陳仲禮寫文章



1989年北京學潮期間，以鄧小平為首的中共元老舉行宮廷政變，非法罷免趙紫陽，扶持江澤民執政。鄧召集六名新常委在家中開會



總170期

●鄧小平在家中會議室召見趙紫陽下台後的政治局常委。六四期間，鄧在此召開兩次元老會議，其內容是張良《六四真相》真實性的爭議焦點之一。（2001年2月號封面）

的動機，「只是希望自己堅定地站在江澤民李鵬羅幹等人一邊，替他們說話。」

張良傲慢地宣稱：「是的，A. Chan太渺小，對其文章的回應，在某種程度上是對他的抬舉。」「我們可以非常欣賞說，迄今為止，還沒遇到一位真正稱得上對手的令我們尊敬的挑戰者。」

張良對陳仲禮的反駁，一直把陳和蕭何綁在一起打，怎樣看待蕭何對《中國六四真相》的批評？究竟蕭何何許人也？張良一說是一名御用安全人員，一說是一個中央專案組，看來張良也未必清楚。為探究蕭何的背景，我曾致電當時星島日報的一位相識多年的副總編輯。他說，蕭何稿子非他經手，但星島發表其文經過反覆討論，認為他質疑《中國六四真相》有根有據，白紙黑字，有刊登價值。他表示，這類爭議，有資料可查對，作者的背景並不重要。

我想，這應是香港同行較有共識的看法，二十年來，目睹中共當局或港共對海外某些人與事的回應和傳媒的處理，都不以因其中共背景而一筆抹煞（社會上常說「英雄不問出處」）。換言之，蕭何即使羅幹的人，其對一本書有如此大量的具體指責，被批評者也有責任加以回應。那種中共打壓就證明我的資料正確無誤的辯詞是不能說服人的。香港連有左派背景的媒體在大陸都被禁被殺，何況一本有關六四的在美國引起轟動的書，中共豈有不禁之理。

陳教授的批評無論與蕭何的文章有多少雷同，他是做了一位學者想做的事，張良完全可以拒絕他的批評，可以反駁，但是，動輒懷疑別人的政治背景，指對方為中共說話，直至不惜貶低批評者的人格，這不是美國學術界自由環境中應有的態度。張良對待蕭何或許可以贏得「政治正確」的同情，但對待一位《中國季刊》的作者，他找錯了對象。張良文章中那有恃無恐，以勢壓人的姿態，即使在香港左派圈子中也已少見。張良他對陳仲禮教授的粗暴態度給人的觀感，不是A·陳向他挑戰，而是他向美國的學術自由挑戰。

## 九八年夏天和黎安友在香港會面

本文不打算對《中國六四真相》的文件可疑處一一推敲，主要想寫的是我認識的張良和他這本書當初出版的一些經過，用以澄清一些真相。

一九九八年夏天，經朋友介紹。六月廿六日下午，我和黎安友教授在香港怡東酒店咖啡座會面。黎教授介紹說，一位暫不透露姓名的X先生，從大陸帶出二千份有關六四的內部文件，包括高層內幕。需要我們協助出版一本三十到四十萬字的書以便公開發行。計劃年底完稿，九九年五月出書。我欣然同意，並回答了香港版稅、市場等問題。黎教授幽默地說，他給李志綏回憶錄、魏京生獄中書信集寫過序，再加上這本，他該「下地獄」了。最後我交幾

本有關六四的開放雜誌給教授轉X先生。

這次和黎安友教授的會見，奠定了我們出版「六四真相」的基礎。黎教授回紐約後，介紹我和張良先生聯繫，通常是傳真到黎家。七月九日晚我和張先生通了一次電話，他說來美不久，出書要具體商量，他希望我從商業角度開列一個單子，看哪些有關六四的問題，讀者最感興趣？不久，我就開列了十八條問題，傳真給他與黎安友，我也很想知道他的看法。七月三十日，他回了一個傳真，一一扼要作答，表示我的十八問題「提得非常好」。這十八個問題，涵蓋了六四前後的重要事件與疑點。給我印象深的是兩條：一是大絕食原因。他說據公安部報告是方勵之夫婦、洛德夫婦授意王丹而起；二是六四死亡人數，他說據報告「死者近二百名」。這很出乎我的意外，因為幾乎是關於六四死亡者的最低數字。

## 在紐約黎安友家初見張良

黎安友教授二〇〇二年六月一日在倫敦大學東方及非洲學院談「天安門文件」時，說過一段話：「編纂者原來打算在一九九九年天安門事件十週年先出中文版，為甚麼事情沒有那樣發生是一個很長的故事，我將很高興同任何願意知道的人分享。」我不知道黎教授後來是否與人分享過這個「很長的故事」，但我知道，和《中國六四真相》關係的密切的多維網在二〇〇一年四月已報導過黎安友教授四月十一

日在紐約法拉盛舉行的記者會上講了一段故事：

「黎安友稱：《中國六四真相》編者張良原計劃在一九九九年先出版中文版，以紀念六十四週年。為此，黎安友首先接觸了台灣、香港的出版社，但台灣的兩家出版商對該書的市場並不看好，所以他轉向香港，當地《開放》雜誌社總編輯金鐘一度在他的客廳裡住了一個星期，閱讀原稿，讀完三分之二後坦稱，文件是真實的，但因為香港人對六四已感到疲倦，所以他對該書在香港的市場前景表示悲觀，即使萬一這本書市場看好，由於中國大陸盜版猖獗，所以出版並不能獲益。」

這個報導直接點了我的名，好像我因賺不了錢而不願出書。但事實並非如此。究竟在黎安友家客廳的一個星期發生了甚麼事？多維網在大肆炒作時，對此隻字不提。那只有我來現身說法。正是這一個星期對該書的出版有決定意義。

經過四個月和張良與黎安友的郵電溝通，雙方決定見面正式商定出書計劃。於是我在九八年十月十一日偕太太從香港飛赴紐約，下榻三十四街的紐約大酒店，住了六天，旅費全部自理，沒有在黎家住過一天，卻是在那裡「上班」。除有一天留在酒店看張良書稿外，天天搭地鐵到一一六街近的哥大教授住宅和張良、黎安友面談（黎有時未出席）。

十三日上午，我和太太第一次見張良。我們十時到達黎教授家，一會兒，張良來到，安

，送誰和不送誰。這本書的初稿二百萬字，是幾個人寫的，現在選出三十萬字出書。

張良的真姓名，我倒是當面問過他，他沒有出聲，在我的筆記本上，寫下三個字：「張思銘」。我點點頭，信以為真。不過，據我後

十三日上午，我和太太第一次見張良。我們十時到達黎教授家，一會兒，張良來到，安迪（黎安友，英文名Andy）介紹後，大家坐下聊天。以前安迪說過張良三十多歲，看來也差不多，約四十歲左右，一副清秀的知識份子模樣，中等個子，說話帶著江浙口音，我猜想，這應是改革開放時期的首長秘書型人物吧。他很健談，稱是中辦局級幹部，有司機、秘書，妻子在大學教書，他們已有很好的生活與前途，寫這本書完全出於道義的原因，以公開內部文件的方式促成六四平反。

張良特別強調，推翻共產黨不可能，因為人才都被網羅在黨內，中共也在變化，中國平均二十人就有一個黨員，所以，只有靠黨內的人才才能改變黨，民主自由才有希望。中國不同世界任何國家，不能亂，海外民運素質低，激烈手段只對中共有利。談到六四，他對當時知識份子激進的行為有嚴厲的批評。認為趙紫陽對戈爾巴喬夫的談話也過激，否則，鄧小平處理六四會溫和些。楊尚昆曾表示不准對學生開槍，但李鵬陳希同下令「使用一切手段」。

談到他的工作，他透露安排戚本禹在上海圖書館的工作是他親自處理的，他知道六四期間「江青與張春橋很有骨氣」，同情學生，反對資本主義。還說了一些高層秘聞，可印證他的機要身份。

關於他帶出來的二千份文件，他說，六四時，他掌握一個管道，可以決定各種文件材料

，送誰和不送誰。這本書的初稿二百萬字，是幾個人寫的，現在選出三十萬字出書。

首次見面氣氛輕鬆。中午安迪請客，叫了四川菜上來吃，下午我就開始看張良已寫成的書稿。

不少人問我看過張良的「文件」沒有？這應該加以交待。我在直到九八年底介入「六四真相」出版的半年間，都沒有把文件的真實性，列入我的關注之內，因為我確實沉入對黎安友教授的完全信任之中，這種信任不僅來自他的名教授地位，而且特別受他為李志綏回憶錄寫的那篇導言所影響，這與我的批毛情結有關。另外，我已習慣作為一名編輯和出版人的責任，特別看重篇幅、文字、可讀性之類的專業要求。因此，見張良那幾天，我沒有提出哪怕是一眼那堆文件的要求。只有一天，張良主動從公事包中拿出兩三份「內部文件」給我看過，對中共文件我有概念，過目而已，記得那只是一般性文件。同時，他還出示過一張他與華國鋒的合影照片（他講過鄧小平搞華國鋒時，曾以華與郭蘭英的照片作為攤牌）。翻查筆記，黎安友曾在我們會談時，問過張良：二千份文件是不是一大箱運出來？當時我均未留意。因此，今天我仍相信，張良是帶出了不少「中共內部文件」，成為寫作《中國六四真相》的基礎，但書中核心部分，如元老會議記錄等是否都來自他帶出的文件？那是另外需要研判的。

張良的真姓名，我倒是當面問過他，他沒有出聲，在我的筆記本上，寫下三個字：「張思銘」。我點點頭，信以為真。不過，據我後來了解，這也是假名，他不姓張。

### 和張良討論書稿並提出意見

和張良接觸中，首先，有一點被過於恭維的感覺，他說高層重視海外輿論，中南海內有三十本《開放》，吳國光的《趙紫陽與政治改革》，中央買了三本（我見他之前推薦過這本書）。當時，對這兩個數字並未質疑，只感到誇張。後來了解，吳國光那本書絕無可能被高層收購三千本，有其百分之一倒可能。

當我看了書稿後，雙方分歧便呈現出來。張良的書稿用電腦打字，橫排，每頁約一千二百字，當時已寫成二百六十七頁，共約三十二萬字，以時間順序，分別描述學生、高層、省市及國外輿論有關學潮的情況，寫到對五一九戒嚴令的反應為止，大約還有二十萬字沒有竣稿。我摘錄一些問題及意見，然後在十五日會談中提出。

我的意見主要是，篇幅比原議超過近一倍，分四條線寫，也未免刻板一些，地方情況及國外反應應可刪削，突出高層內幕，資料來源與作者介紹很重要，最好附一文說明他熟悉的中共檔案制度。

張良回應說，同意加資料註釋，突出高層決策程序，但對作者介紹則主張模糊處理即可

篇幅也不打算削減。張良非常樂觀表示，書出之後，黨內會有強烈反響，將引起高層反思，高層的開明派「領導人」會說話表態，因為這本書沒有和誰過不去，中央省市均會作出反應，書將「百分之百」主導「六四」十週年。張良特別指出，趙紫陽對書不會表態，楊尚昆會，他與鄧的兩次談話記錄，就是楊家提供的。至於文件照片可否刊登，不予考慮。

關於寫序的問題，張良說請黎安友寫。西方中國學家只有哈里·哈丁（何漢理）與黎安友對中共決策有影響作用，哈丁「左」，黎安友「右」，雖遭左派忌恨，但名望高。

前一天（十四日中午），張良不在場，黎安友問我：張良十二月回國，是不是有人支持他平反六四？書出版後的政治意義會不會造成壓力平反六四？我都予以否定的回答，我說除非江澤民是後台，否則，這書出版後，張良回國一定有麻煩。我直言，書的價值在學術史料上，新聞上不會引起轟動。另外，書有為楊尚昆伸冤之意。

### 在銷售與付酬上嚴重分歧

在他們如此樂觀的基礎上，關於銷售的估計就分歧更大。黎安友認為可以賣二十萬本，張良說「利用六十四週年，十萬本肯定沒問題」，他提出了幾本書的銷量：例如《黃禍》三十六萬本，《太子黨》超過四十萬本。我一聽，很吃驚，因為數字太離譜。這兩本書的出版

，都與我們有關，這類書的行情，我們再清楚不過。為了慎重起見，我立即致電香港編輯部，請同事立即了解幾本書的銷售量，第二天我就把完全不同的數據轉告了張良與黎教授。出版界在行銷手法上，適當誇張一點，是常見的事，但數倍、數十倍的吹牛，只會留下笑柄。不知張良被誰誤導？

五月十六日，是紐約會談的最後一天。

開始，還是照既定方針辦。談書名，談出版的時限表，十一月底書稿將完成，分兩次寄我，張良十二月經香港回國，可與見面。計劃請余英時、周儼、白杰明寫序，黎安友特別提出要我寫一篇關於學生絕食的分析文章放在前面，他和張良都表示欣賞我對絕食起因與影響的看法。張良對六四平反仍持樂觀態度，說九六年黨內就有人主張平反，朱鎔基沒問題，李鵬也認識到六四要平反，只有李鵬了解六四全過程。六四鎮壓與江澤民無干係，平反問題，江任內可解決，這本書的出版可以促進之。

但是在談到簽約時，事情拋錨了。主要是關於稿酬問題，張良堅持以十萬本計，合十五萬四千元，一次買斷。即不理會他重申，出書不是為了賺錢，他也不會要求政治庇護，但沒有十萬本這個數，支持者也不好說話。黎教授問我，可否先支付一筆，然後付版稅？

我表態說，我們對這本書的出版是有誠意的，專程來紐約就是證明。我們也保證可以負責地把書編好，在明年五月上市，以配合「六

四」十週年促銷。但是，以十萬冊買斷不可能，十多年見到的海外暢銷書，只有李志綏回憶錄超過十萬本。六四的書出了二百多種，我們這本要暢銷，只有兩種可能，一是內容有爆炸性的材料，二是走李志綏的路，先出英文版，打響後，帶動中文版。我還舉李銳《廬山會議紀實》及吳國光《趙紫陽與政治改革》這兩本材料豐富的著作為例，說它們都沒有超過幾千本（李著只印了一次）。因此，我們這本書用版稅付酬的辦法是合理的，即按銷售分帳。我坦承不僅我們付不起十多萬美元，有錢的出版社也不會這麼幹。

張良堅持說：這個問題還可以再商量，但沒有十萬本，我寧肯不出書。

十七日我們帶著空白的合約書啟程回到香港。

以上回顧顯示，「黎安友客廳一個星期」中，如果沒有我的強力抗辯，「六四」十週年出一本書還不容易嗎？但誰來做冤大頭？明鏡出版社負責人在出書時說，當初港台出版社以市場不佳婉拒出版，他「很難相信張良是為了錢而做這件事」。不知道此話是針對誰而說，但假若他九八年在黎安友客廳會這樣說嗎？我婉拒的不是出版，而是出錢。

十一月底張良告知「出書計劃延後」

紐約之行後，我已假定與張良的合作將告吹。十一月五日接張良傳真，他仍堅持他的書可讀性不比李志綏回憶錄差，堅持要付十五萬

四千元。我告訴太太，她很生氣，覺得被張生欺騙了，要我一定要向安迪說明。十一月十

困擾。雖然，我們夫婦再去紐約時，安迪請我們看他上課（王軍濤為助教）請我們吃飯，彼

於中國的書，簡直嚇死人！美國大炒，香港、台灣當然跟進，《天安門文件》的精采部份的中文稿也大篇幅地推出來。

●1998年11月14日，金鐘致黎安友、張良函的傳真件。



To: Prof. Andrew J. Nathan

黎安友教授，張先生：

張先生回函敬悉。關於銷量的估計，看來還有討論的必要。近來，我還在繼續求證上次提供的參考數據。所述大致沒有錯。比如暢銷書《天怒》香港版的銷量，也不過4萬本（當然不包括大陸盜版在內）。

因此，我們關於六四的書，預計中文版達到10萬本，應無可能。我願再次指出銷量和書的品質在市場上往往是成反比的。

香港中文大學服務中心負責人告訴我，他們收藏的有關六四的書，已接近200本，新書一定要“有爆炸性”才能暢銷。

我們的書的精華部分，我尚未看到，但從上部分可以看到，並非以“爆炸性”取勝。甚至從張先生透露的資料（如六四的死亡人數）來看（不超過200人），還具有某種“反爆炸性”。恕我直言，我們還循實求是，資料已具有權威性，但市場尤其是海外中文市場是非常冷酷的。一本暢銷書往往要犧牲很多東西。

我想我絕對不是保守，書寫得多，對大家都是好事。但我們沒有必要因為明顯的估計錯誤而造成不愉快的後果。

如果我們不能達成協議，希望你們早日找到合作者，並祝成功。開放雜誌屆時將盡力予以宣傳支持。

專此 即頌

安好！

1998—11—14 Hong Kong

志緩沒有御醫身份，書不可能暢銷。十一月二十五日，張良來傳真稱「出書計劃延後」。十二月十四日，黎安友在電話中告訴我，張良已經返大陸，月初經港。仍堅持他對出書的要求。進入一九九九年，節目很多，我們忙於出版《共產中國五十年》，擺脫了張良那本書的

，有限地報導一點九八年會談經過，同時也給安迪作了一個訪問，特別問到文件的可信性，他總以安全為由漫應之。

當時媒體炒作達到一本中文書空前的地步。一位美東的名作家告訴我，他來美國十多年，沒有見到美國主流媒體這樣規模地捧一本關

四千美元。我告訴太太，她很生氣，覺得被張生欺騙了，要我一定要向安迪說明。十一月十四日，我發一函給黎安友表示我們的不滿：1、張良說北京中央買三千本吳國光的書，絕不可能；2、張良稱不按十萬本付酬就不出書，說明他為民主寫書的話實屬虛偽；3、張良的書沒有可讀性，無法暢銷；4、必須考慮如何交待文件出處；5、交待作者背景很重要，李

困擾。雖然，我們夫婦再去紐約時，安迪請我們看他上課（王軍濤為助教）請我們吃飯，彼此都沒有提到出書和張良的事。

二〇〇一年元月初，突然看到美國媒體鋪天蓋地宣傳《天安門文件》，張良的名字明星般再現。一天，黎安友教授打電話給我，說六四那本書英文版即將出版，將寄贈一本給我，希望我在香港協助宣傳，但不要說我見過張良，他說：「你是唯一見過張良的人」。

見過張良的人」。

仍然是出於對黎教授的尊敬，我答應了。於是二〇〇一年二月號《開放》組織了一個大型專題，介紹英文版《天安門文件》。這是三位美國教授的作品，至少不像我看過的書稿那樣龐雜乏味。也有一些記者找我，我覺得應該把紐約之行寫一寫

於中國的書，簡直嚇死人！美國大炒，香港、台灣當然跟進，《天安門文件》的精華部份的中文稿也大篇幅地推出來。

### 張良出書成功的三大策略

這排山倒海的造勢，顯示當初我不看好的這本書出版的成功，確令我感到意外。仔細觀察可以看出，黎安友、張良在運作上採取了三個重大決策：

#### 一、英文版領先，為中文版開路

既然這本書意在影響中共政治，當然以中文版的意義為主，黎張原先的設想是中文版成功後再出其他外文版，如前所述，當我對中文版的市場估計，駁倒他們的盲目樂觀後，他們才決定改弦易轍。可以設想，如果一家出版社能支付十五萬美金，在九九年推出中文版後果如何？後來那家出版該書的出版社在香港的一位代表一次茶敘中說：如果沒有英文版，中文版賣二千本了不起啦。（當然可能多一點）。

記得我們在紐約討論稿酬陷於僵局，我提出走李志緩的路後，黎安友也動過先出英文版的念頭。後來他們果真這樣做了，花了兩年時間編英文版（一九九九與二〇〇〇），二〇〇一年面世時的造勢都強調此時出書是和中共十六大權力鬥爭有關，只是在我的文章指出原是計劃配合「六四」十週年一九九九年出版後，他們才改口承認這點。而且，我的另一點意見，「內容必須有爆炸性」，也被造勢者加以利

用。

我手頭這本「第十九版」《六四真相》黎安友的前言，題為「《中共六四真相》的深遠意義」，但目錄中前言的題目竟是「爆炸性的《中共六四真相》」，這樣明顯的錯誤，竟然多版之後不予改正，編輯的粗疏不說，也反映他們對爆炸性之說的推銷因素的重視，但正如我的一封信所示（附圖），我認為這本書缺乏爆炸性，甚至有反「爆炸性」。

一本書的暢銷有多種因素造成，造勢並非唯一有效的。如李志綏回憶錄，絕無六四文件這本書的大炒作，但長期熱賣，顯然是「有麝自然香」的效應。《六四真相》完全得益於英文版的造勢，而這場造勢又顯示了黎安友教授在美國學界、新聞界乃至政界非凡的人脈與影響力。但這本書與其他非小說類書籍相比，其價值與其媒體捧場度顯然是不相稱的，那麼，黎安友何以獨鍾於它？我的分析是，一、他與張良的體制內改革論的一致性，從他對中共十六大的高度正面評價可見一斑（我曾撰文表示異議）；二、對張良帶出的「二千份」內部文件所懾服，大有如獲至寶之感。平常研究者拿到一份文件已屬不易，二千之數，豈能不動心；三、相信張良代表了中共高層一股有潛力的開明勢力，相信張良對平反六四和這派勢力的樂觀預計（張良曾說，他不出來，升部長沒問題）。這是紐約會談留給我的鮮明印象。

## 二、以安全為由的神秘包裝

保密——對「內部文件」保密，對作者張良保密，是從一九九八年迄今不曾鬆動的策略。神秘感本來是商品社會一個致勝手法，出版業也並非無人操作（如《黃禍》原作者名「一喂」，出版者主動改為「保密」）。「張良」其人，自從CBS專訪蒙面變聲出現以來，雖偶有大作見報，至今仍是隱於市、不露形跡。黎安友特別為他保駕，甚至說我是「唯一」見過他的人。但是，至少在紐約我和太太是一道見張良的，林培瑞則對記者說，他和張良在一起花了不少時間，陳一諮在訪問中也暗示認識張良，而張良還登門拜訪過余英時教授和在紐約的其他朋友，美國圈中人常常和我猜謎（不少人猜張良就是吳稼祥），而傳媒也不時報導張良透露，公安派出大量人員在國外追捕他，跟蹤、威脅懷疑是張良的人……還說，因為他和《六四真相》，大陸已有一百八十人被捕等等。

另一方面，也有不少人對這種保密功夫不以為然，知名的民運人士對我說，我們這些被通緝的對象，在美國遊行、開會、寫文章，哪有什么安全問題！更有人說，中共特工在美國如入無人之境，親共者無處不在，你張良搞出這麼大風波，還想人不知？有人相信能在中央出來，知情甚多者，中共還能查不出來？也有人質疑，你知道公安部最新消息，有那麼多人為你

被捕，為甚麼從不見你為他們的人權呼籲？

聽了太多的故事後，時常想到，這場隱身遊戲要玩到幾時？莫非真要等六四平反的那天，才站出來接受歡呼？事實上，我們還沒有看到因為政治原因，流亡到美國來的人，在美國境內受到中共迫害的例子。

文件的保密，也做得滴水不漏。英文版編者夏偉（Orville Schell）在書後的文章中說，張良那些文件，在我們看來完全可以公開的，但我尊重他們（中國人）的習慣，他們把這種公開視為賣國。編者夏偉這樣的角色，都不能讓他看看文件，實在匪夷所思。夏偉的謹慎態度和黎安友形成對照，他表示六四文件的真實性不能得到證實。

與我們有關的保留則是關於「六四元老政變」之說。《開放》首次在一九九七年六月號上刊出《中共元老六四政變紀實》一文，獨家報導五月二十一日，五月二十七日在鄧小平家的兩次會議情況，由北京作者供稿。而這期雜誌由我交黎安友轉張良收，他以前不知道海外有過這份報導。在《六四真相》中，相關內容與本刊驚人相似，留下一個雞生蛋還是蛋生雞的不解之謎。

其實，在該書中文版剛出版時，我不僅對其編輯之粗糙極為失望，與英文版有如天壤之別，顯示出版社連一點起碼的功夫都不做（如標題、內文字體的簡單設計），而且，也發現內容一些問題。如幾個重要關頭的資料來源，

連「根據會議記錄予以綜述」的簡單交待都沒有，包括元老決定清場、死亡人數報告、趙紫陽「洋洋」等。

多維網形容宗海仁是「中南海出來的人」，以推崇他的「權威」背景。

鑑於《六四真相》和英文版相比的種種間

的人，一個又一個，都不知道他是誰？這是美國呀。」人們想不到，宗海仁的出現，可以為張良減少麻煩。

連「根據會議記錄予以綜述」的簡單交待都沒有，包括元老決定清場、死亡人數報告、趙紫陽自辯辭等。

必須指出，對張良這本書的質疑，並非針對其邏輯和政治上的正確性，而是針對其寫作態度的誠信問題（一般讀者對此或許無所謂）。一位北京著名作家，看過《六四真相》後對我說：「不怕真的（如官方材料），不怕假的（如小說），就怕真假假分不清楚，所以這本書我不會加以引用。」事實上，書中不少材料是有出處可引的，如鄧小平有關六四的三次已發表的講話，全被切割式收入書中，（只說是「根據會議記錄」，但中共領袖正式發表的文章與會議記錄通常不可能一字不差），而中英文本一律不列「參考書目」。我最不滿的是，為甚麼對幾次重要元老會議與談話，英文版可以交待出處在先，後出的中文版則一律免去？張良在回答質疑時解釋說，這是「為了把握好泄密與不泄密的界限。」

又是保密！是不是中共國安人員都不懂英文？為了保密，可以把中文讀者當傻瓜，犧牲他們的知情權。保密牌出手，眾人當閉嘴，學術討論的公開與平等原則被損害，「保密」成了張良為他和他這本書設置的刀槍不入的一堵圍牆。

### 三、戰略轉移：張良與宗海仁

同樣，不少人問我「宗海仁」是誰？

多維網形容宗海仁是「中南海出來的人」，以推崇他的「權威」背景。

鑒於《六四真相》和英文版相比的種種問題，當其於二〇〇一年四月出版後，我們沒有發表任何推薦文章。張良透過黎安友傳來一篇「六四真相與鄧小平」的文章給我，並附一信，謂此文不用張良的名字發表，可用開放編輯部或金鐘或其他名字發表，可任意刪節。我一看，文章萬餘字，七拼八湊的東西——遭此戲弄，實在忍無可忍，即告安迪，「此文不用」。黎張那邊可能感到我的不快，張良才另寫了一篇稿子給我，即刊於五月號的「江澤民庇護賈慶林阮崇武」，並交待署名不用張良，改為「宗海仁」。

此後，宗海仁在香港美國頻頻發表文章，出版《朱鎔基在一九九九》及《第四代》兩本新書（他在書中透露行蹤：九八年春離開國務院，冬天回到中南海，正與他經港返國時間吻合，大約在美國待了半年，寫《六四真相》）。又被推向英文媒體，但依然無一字作者介紹！很快地，宗海仁名聲蓋過張良，據聞有人向美國和台灣的學界與政界人物推薦他，被視為中共高層改革派的代言人。傳台灣高層也透過紐約的這個頭頂光環的小圈子和中共高層有了某種溝通，他們相信北京高層有一個可以抗衡江系的反對派。但宗海仁就如張良一樣，仍然讓人捉迷藏，一位民運活躍份子不耐煩地向我抱怨：「我們要被愚弄到什麼時候啊，這麼出名

的人，一個又一個，都不知道他是誰？這是美國呀。」人們想不到，宗海仁的出現，可以為張良減少麻煩。

以文會友，是這篇故事的來歷。張良沒有尋求美國的庇護，卻找到了黎安友的庇護，這是千真萬確的。他要的東西，現在全有了。粗略估計，他的酬勞已超過九八年向我提出的要求。魯迅詩云，一闊臉就變。他在文章中，把原先對我講的從哈丁和黎安友中「選擇」黎，變成「經反覆比較美國一流的中國問題專家，如黎安友、何漢理、傅高義、李侃如、奧森伯格、林培瑞、傅立民、麥克法誇爾等，最終決定選擇了黎安友。」而在解釋「由於一些現實與政治的原因，終於打消了出版中文版以紀念『六四』十週年的念頭」時，他接著說：「盡管如此，我還是在黨內作了努力，希冀江澤民李鵬能拿出勇氣，重新評價六四事件。」（見本刊二〇〇一年四月號）。

這是何等氣派的口吻！哪裡還有「國務院辦公廳」一名小幹部的影子？他已脫胎為可以凌駕美國學界和黨內說話有份量的人物。到了出版《第四代》時，他在信報發表的前言更是了不得：「我不願意看到因為《第四代》的出版引起北京的緊張和恐慌，特別不希望被有關方面藉此展開一場整肅運動……」

他的書不只一人協作完成，但他念念不忘的是幾位洋專家。就這樣，我們看到美國的制度加上中國的人才，打造了一個奇蹟！

格和機會來搜羅這類文件的。國際常用審核資訊和紀錄真確的條件，是必須能夠證明文件紀錄是真的由文件擬定者擬定，文件紀錄是真的在列舉的時間所擬定。至於公開時保持文件的真確性最簡單的方法，是把文件原原本本地實錄下來，不改动，加工和潤色。港台很多的文獻匯編都是這樣編的。大陸大量文件公開，如人民公社、經濟改革等等文件（毋論其中內容），和關於美國尼克遜水門醜聞，越戰的《總統文件》和艾思保從五角大廈偷出來的越戰文

件等等，都可以滿足以上真確性的條件。

另一方面，張良到現在還不肯公開一份文件的原本，他的身份和資格也不可不知，以安全為理由保持神秘的面紗越來越少說服力。黎教授又承認會議和私人談話都不是當事人當時錄音的紀錄，而張良用事後的材料拼砌而成。加上他的隨感、加工和潤色，再做神秘的包裝，用以上的條件看，文件的真確性完全不能成立。就算用普通常識來評價，結論也是一樣。

網友 DSL 君評我與黎／張爭論時說：因

## 回應金鐘的《六四故事》

◎黎安友

我

想簡單回應金鐘的文章《張良和他的六四故事》（《開放》雜誌二〇〇四年七月號），內裡包括金鐘憶述他於九八年在紐約跟張良會面情況。

雖然金鐘對張良及《中國六四真相》中文版語多批評，但我認為圍繞張良唯一重要的爭議，就是他在書中轉載的材料是否真實。金鐘在我的客廳閱讀書稿時，告訴我他相信內容是真實的。金鐘在文中也說了幾乎相同的事——他當時和今天仍然相信大部份材料是真實的。

事實上，金鐘在文中主要關注的不是真實性，而是他跟張良商談出版合約失敗的事。金

鐘自費到紐約讀未完的書稿，對於我們未能給予他出版中文版的合約，我當時感到遺憾，到今天仍是。但他自己敘述的商討過程，正清楚顯示為何我們不能讓他出書。假如是一位認為書既不具爆炸性，也不會暢銷的出版人，任作者當然不會讓他去出版。

金鐘的分析，也印證了我們改變原來計劃，改為先出英文版後出中文版是明智的。他蔑視為書本造勢的做法，其實這是英文出版界視為良好出版慣例，也符合我們的盼望，為中文版賣得比金鐘所想更好而鋪路。

張良希望書本有政治影響（正如金鐘憶述

為我不搞政治，所以搞不清資訊的真偽，又說用學術規範來弄清真偽是不可能的。這是我不能苟同的。黎安友、林培瑞等也不是搞政治，也是用學術規範來辨證真偽的，而 DSL 對他們的漢學很欣賞。雖然我不同意同僚黎林的判斷，但我對他們也是尊重的。中國問題千頭萬緒，錯綜複雜，政客、個人、新聞界、學術界、都可以用不同的觀點、方法、長處來推敲，所謂同歸殊途，一致百慮。為我獨尊，人身攻擊的批判，對尋找真理是沒有好處的。

◎

張良對他所言），並不代表他的動機為圖利。作者通常要求預支稿酬，以保證出版人會推廣書本。金鐘猜測張良所獲的酬勞數目是錯誤的。

金鐘批評中文版的編輯粗糙，表示他原可做得更好。但張良為中文出版人訂下一項條件，就是不容改動書稿。即使金鐘獲得合約，他也不能展示他編輯功夫。

金鐘憶述了我們九八年的會面，違反了他不透露見過張良的承諾。正如他在文中所言，這是他僅僅三年半前於〇一年一月答應的（他沒有提及九八年的另一次承諾）。

雖然我不評論金鐘文章其他部份的猜測和判斷，但讀者不應視之為我默認。我觀點皆紀錄在案，在《中國六四真相》的英文版導言，以及在《中國季刊》的兩篇文章，所以毋須在此重複。（作者為美國哥倫比亞大學政治科學系主任、《中國六四真相》英文版編輯。此文原載蘋果日報）

## 為何公開見張良經過？

◎金鐘

安友教授對我「張良和他的六四故事」

一文的可應，商引我內告「可」作

事很多，其中之一是當這項承諾失去意義、不

現這種保密功夫是不可接受的，是沒有必要的時候，而且，遠非我一個人見過張良，我為甚麼還要這樣的「江湖義氣」？三年過去，要出名的，出了；要賺的錢，也賺了。我的意見促成他們放棄先出中文版的錯誤策略，而且，英